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 In this paper, Jingjing Wu undertakes an ambitious task:  the adjudication of rights 
between two conceptually distinct worldviews. In one hand are the rights of nature grounded 
by an Indigenous cosmovision and in the other are the secular rights of individuals, 
communities, and corporations. When these rights clash—as they are expected to do—the 
worry is that the rights of nature (as underwritten by spiritual reasoning) will fail to establish its 
merit (or make its case), especially when those rights are considered within a system that 
presupposes the secularity of reasoning. Wu points to the US legal system as providing the 
paradigm response to founding the rights of nature on an Indigenous cosmovision: the 
accompanying spiritual arguments would be deemed “irrational and unjustifiable” and not on 
par with other arguments, such as political, social, or philosophical arguments (Wu, 15). The 
question boils down to this- how are the rights of nature to be justified in way that is admissible 
in contemporary, secular institutions? 
At the outset, I readily admit that it is not an easy task to be the one who must object to 
the project of grounding the rights of nature (I mean, who wishes to be the one that denies 
nature its protection from exploitation/degradation?).  Admittedly, I am sympathetic to Wu’s 
overall project and support the protection of nature. However, I present two general challenges 
to the way in which Wu defends the rights of nature. My paper is thus divided into two sections 
to deal with each challenge separately.  
In the first challenge, I take issue with the initial description of an Indigenous 
cosmovision as the justification for the rights accorded to nature in Ecuador, Bolivia, and New 
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Zealand. I propose that the rights of nature found in the three examples are not derived from 
an Indigenous cosmovision but are instead stipulative. An appeal to an Indigenous cosmovision 
is appropriate when first attempting to amend or rewrite the law (in the case of Ecuador, the 
constitution) to provide nature with rights. (ex. Why should nature have rights, or why should 
we provide rights in our constitution?) However, once codified, the rights are stipulated and so 
it seems that an Indigenous cosmovision is superfluous when trying to adjudicate a conflict of 
rights. Instead, the arguments would appeal to those stated in the law and constitution (or 
interpreted from those) and not from spiritual reasoning.  
Even if my critique stands regarding the three examples (Ecuador, Bolivia, and New 
Zealand), it does not remove the possibility of a conflict of interests in societies where the 
rights of nature have not been codified, such as the United States. It is very easy to imagine a 
situation where an Indigenous community is actively protesting the destruction of nature and 
providing justification for their actions in court. In the second section of this paper, I present 
the barriers to accepting spiritual reasoning as justification for the rights of nature and consider 
Wu’s strategy for overcoming those barriers. As regards the strategy proposed by Wu, I worry 
that utilizing Dworkin’s rights as trumps thesis rests on a weak analogy between humans and 
nature. This analogy, although implicit, underwrites the initial step of Wu’s strategy—the 
creation of a meta-rule to include rights for nature. I conclude that this analogy must be 
addressed to move forward on the justification for rights being extended to nature. 
Before I begin with the first section of critique, I would like to make some general 
comments about the use of the terms, “Indigenous cosmovision” and “Indigenous reasoning”. 
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First, we must be very careful when making general statements about the reasoning of 
Indigenous people. The worry is that by ascribing certain features found in examples from some 
Indigenous communities, we feel safe to ascribe those features to the whole group. The worry 
here is often referred to as Pan-Indianism. (While it does have its uses, we must exercise 
caution when using the term Indigenous). Although I will be referring to an Indigenous 
cosmovision throughout this paper, I think we should keep in mind that some Indigenous 
nations/communities may have differing attitudes toward nature and religious entities. 
Another issue is the suggestion that the recognition of rights comes from a religious 
groundwork. Terms, like sacred, do sometimes refer to religious practice, but it can also refer to 
the practices of being in the world- those that are connected with epistemology and knowledge 
praxis. For example, an American Indian community, like the Oceti Sakowin (Sioux Nation), may 
seek to protect a particular body of water from pollution, but the motivation for doing so is that 
the river is understood to be a relation, like a family member. For many Indigenous 
communities, relationships are part of their ontology. Thus, the obligation to be respectful may 
come from standing in a relationship with that particular entity and not something that is 
mandated by a higher power. It is spiritual, but not understood in the same way that a non-
Indigenous person would think of as religious. Note too that the descriptions for the rights of 
nature in Ecuador as expressed in the constitution do not have religious underpinnings. I 
express these two worries—the worry about Pan-Indianism and the conflation of 
sacred/spiritual with religious merely to point out that what may hold for the Indigenous 
peoples of Ecuador and Bolivia (Qechua) and the Tūhoe of New Zealand may differ from other 
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Indigenous people across the globe. That said, if a commonality could be located, for example 
something like relationships, then the problem of spiritual reasoning may be mitigated. If not, 
then it seems that the justification of the rights of nature may actually be piecemeal 
(pluralism?). 
 
First Section—Stipulated Rights vs. Indigenous Cosmovision 
The trouble with the cases provided by Ecuador, Bolivia, and New Zealand is that the 
rights granted to nature are stipulated in the constitution and legal code of those countries. As 
Wu describes, there are similarities between Ecuador and Bolivia—those being cultural, legal, 
and the composition of the societies (Wu, 5). These similarities are not surprising given that a 
large number of the population of each country are the descendants of the Incan Empire (the 
Qechuan people)—where most non-Indigenous people see national borders, the Indigenous 
communities had those borders imposed upon them post discovery/colonization. The Qechua 
lived along the Andes and today, their descendants are present across several countries in 
South America. Thus, it makes sense that the communities are very similar with respect to their 
traditions; they share a common culture. To use these two societies as support for a singular 
Indigenous cosmovision emphasizes the colonial borders and not the Indigenous ones. 
Colonialism causes us to see difference where it may not exist. The introduction of the Tūhoe 
people of New Zealand helps, but we are relying solely on really two distinct Indigenous 
perspectives. 
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An additional worry that I have concerning an Indigenous cosmovision is the uncritical 
emphasis on what are deemed to be distinctly Indigenous principles/ideas. Pachamama or Vivir 
Bien in the legal codes of Ecuador and Bolivia may be based on similar principles, but culture is 
dynamic and so I doubt that these notions, as they appear in the law, are solely Indigenous or 
religious. The notion of Pachamama present day may differ from its use by the ancestors of the 
Qechua people. I am not suggesting radical differences (though there are practices that have 
since ceased—like human sacrifices), but what I do suggest is that the intimate ties with the 
religion of their colonizers (Christianity) has diluted or changed the original Indigenous 
cosmovision so that it is not considered alien by society. As part of colonization, religious 
observances and practices that were distinctly Incan now share Christian holy days and the 
belief in Pachamama has taken a different cast under the influence of colonization—so much so 
that hikers to Machu Pichu are asked if they would like to participate in offerings to 
Pachamama.1 That these Indigenous notions have become socially acceptable is what enables 
them to be written into laws and constitutions. I suggest that Ecuador and Bolivia are more 
homogeneous than a multicultural country, like the United States, which is the example of a 
legal system Wu uses for demonstrating the barriers for rights based on an Indigenous 
cosmovision. Note that Wu was careful to state that religiously homogeneous countries, like an 
Islamic state, would not be considered in the paper because those countries lack difference 
between what is legal and what is religious. A settler state like, the United States, is not 
 
1 Hill, Michael (2008). "Inca of the Blood, Inca of the Soul". Journal of the American Academy of Religion. 76(2): 251–
279. doi:10.1093/jaarel/lfn007. 
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homogeneous and it would prove a challenge to have the rights of nature incorporated into law 
pace Ecuador and Bolivia.   
Given that the term Indigenous cosmovision is only supported by essentially two 
examples and that those resulting examples are the results of colonization, I am not convinced 
that the Indigenous cosmovision is as religious or spiritual as Wu contends. It also leads me to 
question whether the focus should be on the arguments utilized within the context of the 
adjudication of conflict. Instead, it may be more appropriate to the arguments that motivate 
the codification of the rights of nature. As it stands, the rights given to nature in Ecuador, 
Bolivia, and New Zealand are stipulated in the law. For example, in the case of New Zealand, 
nature is considered a person and its attendant rights/obligations are conducted by proxy. Once 
one has rights, it seems that the law, whether in a constitution or given by proxy, is what 
justifies those rights when assessing the conflict of those rights. Thus, it seems that the real 
worry for Wu is not whether spiritual arguments are troublesome for deliberations of conflict. 
Rather, it is whether spiritual arguments can justify getting the rights of nature 
included/codified into law.   
Although I have challenged the examples of rights underwritten by an Indigenous 
cosmovision, I do think that an interesting contribution might be in the case of Indigenous 
testimony; particularly in cases where Indigenous communities have mobilized to protect 
nature (a river, a lake, a mountain, etc.) against mining, fossil fuel transport, and the like; 
especially in a country where the rights of nature are not provided for in the law. In these cases, 
Wu’s “Indigenous Cosmovision and Rights of Nature: A Legal Inquiry” 
Commentary- Sullivan-Clarke 
OSSA, June 3-6, 2020 
 7 
it seems that Barrier Two (the charge of irrationality) as presented by Wu would disadvantage 
Indigenous people using spiritual claims as part of their case in a secular legal system.  
 
Section Two- Barriers, Strategy, and Analogy 
Let’s suppose that I am in error about the first section and that there needs to be a 
method for adjudicating between the arguments that support the rights of nature when in 
conflict with other human rights. 
 As Wu states, the task of having the rights of nature recognized by a legal system (while 
at the same time not overriding the rights of others) encounters three barriers: the first is that 
spiritual reasoning is non-defeasible, which means that if the rights of nature (as underwritten 
by an Indigenous cosmovision) are incorporated into secular law, then it must be accepted by 
all parties.  The reason for this, according to Wu, is that the rights of nature are justified by 
monotonic, conclusive, and non-defeasible arguments (12). By incorporating an Indigenous 
cosmovision into legislation, the legal system singularly adopts this particular worldview as the 
frame, making “other competing reasoning” a non-starter. This is great for nature, however, it 
is absurd given that most legal systems are predicated on the unique status of humans.  
 Wu identifies a second barrier—that spiritual reasoning is considered irrational—which 
prevents such arguments from being fully considered in a secular court. In this case, as Wu 
suggests, spiritual reasoning would be devoid of its justification (the Indigenous cosmovision). 
To an Indigenous philosopher, this barrier is not limited solely to the context of affording rights 
to nature. The discipline of philosophy has a robust history of marginalizing the thought and 
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epistemology of Native American and First Nations communities, noting the people were too 
primitive, too passionate, or living in a state of nature to be rational. That the epistemology of 
Native Americans is not propositional and that their narratives lack the patterns and 
justifications required in Western epistemology—well, let’s just say that this barrier has a 
somewhat familiar ring to it. To describe the reasoning as irrational is troubling: it not only 
seems hasty, but it also problematizes the people and not the institutions that fail to recognize 
inferences outside of a narrow few. For example, the emotions, long considered outside the 
realm of rationality are now gaining traction as a result of research done by feminist 
epistemologists. The narratives and oral traditions of Indigenous people—histories that only 
until recently were kept outside of the courtroom—are now being accepted as evidence. While 
I do not doubt that secular, colonial courts would deem the arguments underwritten by an 
Indigenous cosmovision as irrational, I question whether it is a problem with the arguments, or 
is it perhaps a problem with the institution?  That said, it may be there are multiple ways of 
dealing with this barrier—Wu’s creation of a meta-rule being only one. 
 The third barrier identified by Wu is that drawing an analogy between the rights of 
nature and human rights fails. As a possible solution to the impasse created by the first two 
barriers, Wu considers understanding the rights of nature in the same manner that we 
understand human rights (15). There are several reasons for doing so: the arguments for 
human rights are “non-defeasible, irrational, and started with spiritual connotations” (15). They 
are, in short, analogous to the rights for nature. Unfortunately, Wu claims that this fails because 
the spiritual basis for grounding human rights drops from the justification—granting rights to 
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humans is grounded on “being human.” The club, according to Wu, is closed and one cannot 
become a member of a closed club.  
Wu notes that those in the club could open the membership to include other categories, 
and according to Wu, the talk of rights of nature gets on the table via Dworkin’s thesis: rights as 
trumps. Dworkin’s thesis is a way to prevent the overreach of the majority in a utilitarian 
society that functions under the egalitarian principle. The worry for Dworkin is that a society 
that forms policy via utilitarianism (and its accompanying egalitarianism) could marginalize 
minority/unpopular groups within the society. By giving groups rights, the government prevents 
the use of the egalitarian principle from riding roughshod over the interests of minority groups. 
As regards Wu’s account, I am confused as to what is the minority or unpopular group—is the 
focus on protecting the beliefs of Indigenous people (which are potentially a minority view) or 
is Nature considered the group (after all, it is nature that is getting the rights and that is not 
popular either). Wu needs to make this point clear if they rely on Dworkin’s thesis.  
The second piece of Wu’s strategy is to create a meta-rule that opens the door for 
legitimizing spiritual reasoning in the legal system; one that “overrides” the three barriers 
presented earlier. The meta-rule paves the way for spiritual reasoning to be presented in court 
as the justificatory reasoning for the rights of nature and more importantly, it allows for the 
introduction of a nonhuman member into the club. In fact, since Wu uses the United States as a 
paradigm, I suggest that Wu research the creation of corporate personhood to bolster the 
likelihood of a nonhuman entity being accepted into the club. It may be that in this way, nature 
could be afforded rights. 
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The third piece of Wu’s strategy serves as the ground for how much weight can be 
afforded to the rights of nature when under deliberation. According to Wu, the principle of 
proportionality (the balance of competing views) would be brought to bear on deliberations 
when rights conflict. Recall, that the non-defeasibility of spiritual reasoning could override most 
other arguments concerning rights. Proportionality, for Wu, prevents the rights of nature from 
superseding all other rights. 
 Wu believes that this strategy: the rights as trumps, creation of a meta-rule, and the 
principle of proportionality would not only introduce the arguments supporting the rights of 
nature into a secular legal system, but would also function within the deliberations of conflict to 
ensure a fair treatment of all involved. While these strategies are complex and require 
unpacking, their treatment appears in the last two and a half pages of the paper. Thus, there 
are some holes, such as whether Indigenous communities or nature are the unpopular groups 
in a utilitarian society that possess rights that trump. 
 A more pressing issue, however, is the use of Dworkin’s rights as trumps to support the 
creation of a meta-rule for including the spiritual reasoning that supports the rights of nature. 
My worry is that there is a weak (and possibly implicit) analogy between nature and humans in 
the use of Dworkin’s thesis. First, Dworkin’s account is intended to address the overreach of a 
“utilitarian society under the egalitarian principle” (17).  Foremost, the theory of utilitarianism 
presupposes a human focus. Accounts of utility, whether those accounts aim to maximize 
desire or preference satisfaction, presuppose agency (human agency).  
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Perhaps Wu intends to avoid this worry by appealing to the creation of a meta-rule—
one that permits nature into the club. Yet this solution is problematic--if we allow for a 
nonhuman group into the club—the justifications for rights (that trump), at least as they are 
laid out by Dworkin, are anthropocentric. For example, Dworkin refers to liberty and equality as 
reasons for allowing the rights of some groups to trump the egalitarian principle. A society that 
is predominantly Christian may seek to establish a law against same sex marriage. The right to 
equality, however, might be invoked by gay and lesbian couples to trump the utilitarian policy 
prohibiting their legal union. Another justification for the rights of a minority trumping 
utilitarian policy might be privacy, which is believed to be granted by the Constitution (via the 
historical interpretation by the US Supreme Court). Even in cases where we allow for 
interpretation of constitutional rights, there still needs to be a justification that is not 
anthropocentric when granting the ability to trump to nature. The justification for having rights 
as trumps are, at least as put forth by Dworkin, anthropocentric—liberty and equality. Given 
that nature and humans are not similar in the ways relevant for liberty and equality, I am not 
sure where the justification for nature having rights that trump would originate and so I believe 
the analogy fails. Wu will need to provide some kind of account to support that nature has 
rights that may trump utilitarian policy. 
 Perhaps the creation of the meta-rule is the part of the strategy that introduces the 
nature into the club? It seems that here too would require a justification for membership. Given 
that spiritual reasoning is seen as irrational, I do not see a way to convince the membership to 
include nature without a general (nonspiritual) argument. There must be a reason for the 
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exception. As I have mentioned earlier, corporate personhood may provide some insight as to 
formulating reasons and arguments for granting nature member status in the human being 
club. Yet, the reasons for creating a meta-rule must be provided.  
The creation of a meta-rule to allow for the inclusion of nature into the club reveals 
another worry: stipulating the rights of entities that have a link to spiritual or religious 
worldviews would open the door for other, similar entities to be granted status as well. One 
such entity, fetuses, has been a player in deliberations regarding personhood for years, and 
supporters for the view that fetuses have rights (that trump) would be keen on finding a 
strategy that would grant membership into the club. Before someone suggests that I am 
heading down the path to a slippery slope, I contend that fetuses could have more in common 
with being human than nature, and being human was the justification for human rights.  
 According to Wu, if we are able to “declare [that the] rights of nature are as important 
as fundamental human rights” then the spiritual reasoning would trump human rights (Barrier 
One), with the next step being to use the proportionality principle to solve the clash of rights. It 
is at this point that Wu is moves to the proportionality principle and the adjudication of conflict. 
But Wu has not provided a way to make the antecedent of the conditional true. If the United 
States did believe that the rights of nature were on par with human rights, then we should find 
recourse in the legal system. Yet, we do not. The US does recognize nonhuman entities with 
rights—corporations—but nature is still not in the club.  
 At the beginning of this paper, I noted that Wu takes on an ambitious project. When we 
see the many threats to nature on social media, it seems natural to move to a way to protect 
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nature (in all its forms—lakes, rivers, plains, etc.) from degradation. As I sit at my desk in a 
world experiencing a pandemic, I am struck by the resilience of nature when humans are forced 
to quarantine. Nature does not need humans—we need nature. How very strange that it is us 
that must grant it rights to protect it. I thank the author for the opportunity to read this very 
interesting paper and I look forward to their response. 
  
 
